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In Indonesia, Hari Sumpah Pemuda, Hari Proklamasi and Hari Pahlawan are three major days of commemoration. Hari Sumpah Pemuda, or Youth Oath Day, on 28 October commemorates the oath sworn by Indonesian youth (*pemuda*) at a congress held on that day in then Batavia in 1928. The oath involved that Indonesia was to be one nation, one country, with one language. It was at this congress that the composer Wagé Supratman introduced the Indonesian anthem, *Indonesia Raya*, and that the red-and-white flag was flown for the first time.¹ In Mohammad Yamin's (1955:18) perception, the Indonesian Nation was actually reborn on 28 October 1928. As was to be expected, the *pemuda* played an important part in the future developments in their country. They figured prominently in the *perjuangan*, or armed struggle, against the Japanese, the British and the Dutch, as also in the overthrow of President Sukarno two decades later², and recently again in the events that led to the resignation of President Suharto.³

¹ See Yamin 1955:15-6; Nugroho Notokusanto 1979:12-3; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto 1984a:193; L. de Jong 1984:338. As is pointed out by Sugondo Joyopuspito (1974:212), *Indonesia Raya* was first played at the close of the congress on 28 December 1928. According to Kahin (1952:97), the oath went back to a conference in 1926 and *Indonesia Raya* was composed for a youth congress to be held in 1929.

² See Dahm 1971:239. Interestingly, in 1928 it was mainly the students of the Batavia Schools of Law and Medicine who took the initiative for the congress (Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto 1984a:208). In Resink's view (1974:433), the Law students were the most influential at the congress, while in 1966 again it was the students of the University of Indonesia, which in Jakarta has developed from the Batavia Schools of Law and Medicine, who led the *pemuda* against the government (Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto 1984b:406-7). Their action had the blessing of the army (Hindley 1970:42; Legge 1972:401), or probably was even orchestrated by it. Some of the students were later most generously rewarded for their part in this and during the Suharto regime became business tycoons.

³ Again it was the students of the University of Indonesia who began the demonstrations on

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Opinions differ (see Reid 1974:28), however, regarding the part of the *pemuda* in the proclamation of independence by Sukarno and Hatta on 17 August 1945, just two days after Japan's surrender at the end of World War II. This event is commemorated as Hari Proklamasi, or Proclamation Day. Some, notably Dutch, authors (for example, Overdijkink 1946:43; De Kadit 1989:89; Smit 1952:45) make it look as if the *pemuda* actually coerced Sukarno and Hatta at gunpoint into proclaiming independence after kidnapping them and confining them in the PETA barracks in Rengasdengklok, some 80 kilometres by road to the east of Jakarta. Hatta (1970:16, 36), on the other hand, expresses the opinion that, due to their being kidnapped on 16 August, the proclamation was delayed by one day. Both he (Hatta 1970:47) and Sukarno (Adams 1965:213-5) claim that there were no discussions whatsoever with the *pemuda* during the period they were kidnapped. The discussions, as well as the threats, occurred before that, on the 15th. Sukarno and Hatta did not yield an inch, however, and resisted all pressure.⁴ De Graaf (like, recently, Giebels and several other authors), leaning on Adam Malik's book, even though he considers its tone 'malicious', is inclined to disbelieve Sukarno and Hatta.⁵ Adam Malik (1975:51-2) and Sidik Kertapati (1964:108-9), who were both members of a *pemuda* group involved in the kidnapping, state that the kidnappers did have discussions with the two leaders in Rengasdengklok, but say not a word about any intimidation. Neither author was in Rengasdengklok at the time, however. Sukarno and Hatta's denial of any discussions taking place is corroborated by Oemar Bahsan (1955:52-3), the acting commander of the PETA in Rengasdengklok at the time of the kidnapping, who says discussions only started after Subardjo arrived from Jakarta. According to Subardjo himself (1972:94-6), he was the only person to have had discussions with the kidnappers (see also B.R.O'G. Anderson 1961:76). Affiliated with Rear-Admiral Maeda's Japanese Naval Liaison Office, Subardjo had received information about the kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta's whereabouts from a leading *pemuda* working at the same office after he had

19 February 1998 (Aspinall 1999:215; Aspinall and Van Klinken 1999:161). On 25 February the Association of University of Indonesia Graduates made public its feelings about the deplorable situation in Indonesia. Differently from 1966, the students this time were not supported by the army (*Suara Pembaruan*, 4 May 1998, 3947:1, and 7 May 1998, 3950:6). The question is who will become the next target of the student actions. The army?

⁴ See Adams 1965:208; Hatta 1970:35; Subardjo 1972:81-2. As is pointed out by Roem (1970:19-20), Hatta did not mention the heated discussions (which in Hatta 1952, pp. 338-9, are mentioned in a footnote) in the original version of 1951 (Osman Raliby 1953:655-9). Both Adam Malik (1975:43-5) and Sidik Kertapati (1964:96-7) concede that Sukarno and Hatta did not budge from their standpoint, but refrain from mentioning any threats by the *pemuda*.

⁵ De Graaf 1959:316; Giebels 1999:350. See also, for example, Nasution 1977a:205; Kahin 1952:135; Legge 1972:199; B.R.O'G. Anderson 1972:75-6; L. de Jong 1985:1036; De Vletter, Voskuil, and Van Diessen 1997:74.

assured the latter that Maeda had promised his support and protection of the independence movement. For the same reason Subardjo was allowed to take both leaders back to Jakarta (ARA AS 5204-18:4-5; Subardjo 1972:83-90). As we will see, Maeda's promise ran counter to the orders issued by the army commander, which induced one of the latter's advisors to call Maeda a traitor (Nishijima 1986:321). According to Nugroho Notosusanto's research (1979: 133) as well, the *pemuda* had intended the kidnapping to intimidate the two, but had shrunk from entering into any discussions with them out of respect for their authority.

The point at issue (Hatta 1970:12; Subardjo 1972:81) was that the *pemuda* pressed for a proclamation of independence to be made in a revolutionary way through the overthrow of the Japanese. Although there were several different groups of *pemuda* in Jakarta at the time (see Adam Malik 1975:29-36; Nishijima and Kishi Kōichi 1963:449-51, 462; Kahin 1952:111-3, who overlooks the naval group), they were united on this point. Sukarno and Hatta firmly opposed such a coup, since they expected that the Japanese army would surely crush it. The two, in their difference with the *pemuda*, clung to a proclamation of independence through the Independence Preparatory Committee, established by the Japanese shortly before Japan's surrender, a meeting of which they had already arranged to be held on 16 August. This committee in their view could be considered to represent the entire country, as its members were prominent persons from the various regions of Indonesia (Hatta 1970:11; Subardjo 1972:74). By proclaiming independence through it, they expected it to come about peacefully, without any irregularities or bloodshed at the hands of the Japanese.

However that may be, most authors who claim that the *pemuda* tried persuasion on Sukarno and Hatta during their kidnapping concede that their efforts were fruitless.⁶ Besides, the *pemuda* failed in their attempt at a coup against the Japanese in Jakarta.⁷ As both Sukarno and Hatta were informed

⁶ See the authors mentioned in footnote 5. A different view is presented, however, by Overdijkink (1946), De Kadt (1989), Smit (1952), Sjahrir (1949:257-8), Woodman (1955:195), Legge (1964:132), and Cribb (1984:62, 1986:75, and, containing a more accurate account, 1991:50). Adam Malik (1975:51-2), Sidik Kertapati (1964:108) and Tan Malaka (1998:155) admit that the kidnapers were not able to achieve anything until the arrival of Subardjo. Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto (1984b:82), referring to Subardjo, assert that Sukarno told Singgih, the PETA officer in charge of the kidnapping, in a personal conversation that he was prepared to make the proclamation after returning to Jakarta. However, I was not able to find anything about this conversation in Subardjo 1972 (p. 94). Moreover, I doubt if any statement by Sukarno to Singgih really did imply a turnaround, as Sukarno and Hatta had already decided to proclaim independence, though strictly according to their own scenario, before the kidnapping. Giebels (1999:350) inclines to the view, on the other hand, that Sukarno agreed to proclaim independence in the revolutionary way insisted on by the *pemuda*, but then renewed his initial refusal to do so.

⁷ Adam Malik 1975:52-4; Sidik Kertapati 1964:104-5; Adams 1965:214; Hatta 1970:15-6; Roem 1970:29-32; Nasution 1977a:205-6; Aboe Bakar Loebis 1995:102; De Graaf 1959:316-7; Legge

(Adams 1965:211; Hatta 1970:38), it was in view of this intended coup that they had to be taken to a safe place outside Jakarta. Then, since the coup did not eventuate, there was no longer any reason to fear for their safety, so that the *pemuda* could not but allow them to return to Jakarta (Subardjo 1972:88, 96; see also Hatta 1970:48-9).

Adam Malik, contrary to this, claims that Sukarno and Hatta's return to Jakarta was due to the Persetujuan Rengasdengklok (Rengasdengklok Agreement)⁸, suggesting that the two leaders at last succumbed to *pemuda* pressure. According to his own account (1975:51-2), however, they insisted, while in Rengasdengklok, on having definite news of Japan's surrender (which Hatta explicitly denies, see footnote 9). Subardjo arrived from Jakarta, confirming the news of the surrender, later that day.⁹ If Sukarno and Hatta indeed insisted on having definite news, as alleged, then, in my view, they would have agreed to proclaim independence only because their own requirement had at last been met. Consequently there was no question at all of their having given in to the *pemuda*. There simply was no longer any reason for them to persist

1972:199; B.R.O'G. Anderson 1972:77-8; Reid 1974:29. Cribb (1984) does not say anything about this. *Peranan TNI* (1965:26) mentions the decision by the *pemuda* on 16 August to attack the Japanese, but does not say how it came about. Sluimers (1998:359) claims that, when the *pemuda* were urging a speedy proclamation, PETA units were entering Jakarta, whereas according to Nasution (1977a:214) there was only one PETA company in Jakarta, the Japanese having dispersed the other companies outside the city.

⁸ Adam Malik 1975:56-7; Sidik Kertapati 1964:108-9; *Peranan TNI* 1965:25; Nishijima and Kishi Kōichi 1963:501, who base their account entirely on Adam Malik. Dahm (1969:313) seemed at first inclined to accept Adam Malik's version, but later (1971:111) was more cautious. Subardjo himself (1972:96), on the other hand, does not mention any discussions with Sukarno and Hatta after his arrival, or any agreement with them. He was the only person present to state definitely (in view of the support promised by Rear-Admiral Maeda) that the proclamation was to be made the next day (Subardjo 1972:90, 94; Adam Malik 1975:57). So if there was any agreement, it was between Subardjo and the kidnappers (see also Nugroho Notosusanto 1979:133). In his later publications Adam Malik (1980:121) is careful to avoid all suggestion of an agreement with Sukarno and Hatta.

⁹ When Sukarno and Hatta tried to find out from the Japanese on 15 August if Japan had surrendered, Rear-Admiral Maeda's reaction was evasive (NIOD 006836; 006900; Nishijima 1986:314; ARA AS 5204-18:3; Subardjo 1972:74), which led them to conclude that the news was true (Hatta 1970:31, 44). The tone of the translation by the interpreter, Nishijima (1986:314), might have given them a hint of the truth, but Maeda's reply was not as unequivocal as B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:68) suggests (De Vletter, Voskuil, and Van Diessen, 1997:74, even claim that Sukarno and Hatta had decided in close consultation with Maeda to hold the Independence Preparatory Committee meeting the next day). Maeda then told Subardjo (1972:84) the next morning, when Sukarno and Hatta had already been kidnapped, that he had meanwhile received official news and wanted to pass it on to the two leaders. Apparently Subardjo (1972:96) consequently assumed that the kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta still needed this confirmation, and therefore repeated the news to them after his arrival in Rengasdengklok, which probably accounts for Adam Malik's version (1975:56). Kahin (1952:135), De Graaf (1959:319), Dahm (1971:111), Legge (1972:200), and Penders and Sundhaussen (1985:17) assume that it was still essential for Sukarno and Hatta in Rengasdengklok to obtain certainty of Japan's surrender.

in their refusal. Moreover, the Independence Preparatory Committee had already assembled in Jakarta and was waiting for Sukarno and Hatta to join it (Subardjo 1972:96; Sutardjo, as referred to by Oemar Bahsan 1955:49; Adams 1965:214; Hatta 1970:49). Since the *pemuda* had not achieved anything in the entire short-lived affair, they had no other alternative but to let Sukarno and Hatta return to Jakarta. The two leaders arrived there late in the evening of 16 August. So in fact it was the *pemuda* who had yielded.

Legge (1972:204) and Reid (1974:29), like Roem (1970:40-1), doubt whether the Independence Preparatory Committee would have made a move towards a proclamation on 16 August had the kidnapping not occurred. In this they overlook Sukarno's persuasive powers, although Reid (1974:19) himself asserts that it was Sukarno who pushed through a draft constitution in the committee studying the preparations for independence with great speed in July 1945. Dahm (1969:313), Abu Hanifah (1972:148), and Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto (1984b:77) also believe that *pemuda* pressure was necessary to impress the urgency of a proclamation upon Sukarno and Hatta.

To me personally it seems that both were well aware of the urgency of this step. Hatta (1970:24-5) had already told someone on 14 August in Singapore, on his way back to Jakarta from Saigon, that independence was to be proclaimed as soon as possible. Reid (1974:21) even suggests, though without mentioning his source, that Sukarno and Hatta had already rescheduled the meetings of the Independence Preparatory Committee to start on 16 August during their return journey. And Sukarno had already set to work on the proclamation, after concluding that Japan had in fact surrendered, on 15 August (see footnote 9; Adams 1965:206), whilst Hatta had arranged for the Independence Preparatory Committee to meet on 16 August (see also Subardjo 1972:74) – of which, as B.R.O'G. Anderson (1961:70) points out, Adam Malik very conspicuously omits any mention – and started typing out the draft proclamation (Hatta 1970:32-3; Subardjo 1972:76). Sjahrir (1949:255), the leader of another *pemuda* group that insisted on a revolutionary proclamation, but which was not involved in the kidnapping, even claims that Sukarno decided to declare independence after 5 p.m. on the 14th, but then postponed this till the 15th.¹⁰

Roem (1970:41-2) is grateful to Sukarno and Hatta for not giving in to

¹⁰ B.R.O'G. Anderson (1961:66) and Dahm (1969:311-2, 1971:110) refer to Sjahrir as though these dates were 15 and 16 August (see Legge's analysis, 1972:196). Sjahrir's account in fact mentions the *pemuda*'s attempts to prevail upon Sukarno, the kidnapping, and the drafting of the proclamation as occurring one day earlier. This confused Aboe Bakar Loebis (1995:99), who consequently makes it look as though Sjahrir talked to Sukarno after the latter's return from Maeda on 15 August (see footnote 9), whereas, as Legge points out, Ali Budiardjo confirms that this was on 14 August, when Sjahrir was frustrated by Sukarno's disbelief in Japan's surrender. Adams

pemuda pressure. This way they preserved their authority, which was to prove of great importance in the years to come, when they were President and Vice President respectively. On the other hand he asserts that the *pemuda*'s actions were very useful to them as an argument in their attempt to ensure Japanese neutrality and so to avoid bloodshed. Such an attempt was made by them, despite strong *pemuda* objections to any Japanese involvement, during discussions with Major-General Nishimura, the Sōmubuchō, or Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Japanese Military Administration, in the small hours of 17 August. The question remains, however, whether the *pemuda* actions really provided such a strong argument in these discussions.

Legge (1972:204) and Reid (1974:29) have no doubts about this. The participants in the discussion, both Indonesian and Japanese, however, are unanimous that Sukarno and Hatta absolutely failed to obtain Nishimura's consent for a proclamation of independence.¹¹ Nishimura (ARA AS 5208(c):5) explained during his interrogation in 1946 that the news of Japan's surrender reached the authorities in Java on 15 August. The Saikō Shikikan, or Commander-in-Chief of the 16th Army, Lieutenant-General Nagano, then received orders to proceed no further with the independence plans, which he passed on to his subordinates (compare, however, Nishijima and Kishi Kōichi 1963:478-9; Miyamoto 1973:50; *War History Series* 1976:8; Nugroho Notosusanto 1979:129). When Sukarno and Hatta referred to the possibility of riots, Nishimura was not at all impressed, but replied: 'If there are those who wish to run riot, there is nothing to do but to let them do so: It is not desired, but the army will have no alternative but to suppress them by force' (NIOD 059326-II:67; ARA AS 5207:2; Adams 1965:216; Hatta 1970:55). Adam Malik (1975:64-5) and Sidik Kertapati (1964:111-3) – quite understandably, since they were opposed to consulting the Japanese – like some other Indo-

(1965:207) reports that Sukarno decided on 17 August for several religious reasons, though Roem (1970:41) believes this to be a story invented afterwards. Sjahrir's account is inaccurate as well where it says that Hatta was to inform him of Sukarno's stance at noon, as according to Hatta (1970:26), Sukarno and he still had to have lunch with the Japanese army commander after their arrival from abroad at 11 a.m. According to *Asia Raya* 4-195 of 14 August 2605, Sukarno and Hatta arrived at the airport at 1.15 p.m., but according to De Graaf (1959:307) at 5 p.m. Friend (1988:117) suggests that it was Hatta and Sjahrir, rather than Sukarno and Hatta, who went to Maeda for confirmation of the reports of Japan's surrender (but see footnote 9).

¹¹ Adams 1965:216; Hatta 1970:54-6; Nishimura, in ARA AS 5205-23:2; Maeda, in NIOD 006837, 006900; ARA AS 5205-32:5. See also Nomura, in ARA AS 5205-37:15, Nakamura, in ARA AS 5207:1 and 5208(a):1, Nakatani, in NIOD 059326-II:67, and Saitō (Gotō 1984:13), who also attended the meeting (ARA AS 5204-15). Miyoshi, who was also there, was not interrogated on this point. Nishijima (1986:320-1) makes the same assertion, claiming that he was at Nishimura's residence, though this is contrary to Maeda's (ARA AS 5204-15) and his own statement elsewhere (ARA AS 5204-18:7).

nesian sources (for example, Susanto Tirtoprodjo 1963:9; *Peranan TNI* 1965:27; Soejitno Hardjosoediro 1987:32-3), make no mention of this discussion with Nishimura in their publications. In the opinion of authors like Kahin, Nugroho Notosusanto, Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, and Salim Said, however, Sukarno and Hatta indeed took the risk of a bloody Japanese suppression when they proceeded to proclaim independence in spite of Nishimura's opposition.¹² As Sjahrir (1949:258) also states, the Japanese army was definitely opposed to this.

Though I am not able to look inside the hearts of the two Indonesian leaders, it seems quite probable to me that the neutrality of the Japanese, though essential, was not really an absolute prerequisite for them. This is borne out by the fact that Sukarno and Hatta after their return from Rengasdengklok, but before their visit to Nishimura, ordered Subardjo to invite the members of the Independence Preparatory Committee to meet at Maeda's residence (Hatta 1970:51, 56, 59; Subardjo 1972:99, 111), which is confirmed by both Maeda (ARA AS 5204-15) and Sjahrir (1949:258). Adam Malik (1975: 64-5) – understandably, as Sukarno and Hatta again ignored the *pemuda's* urgings, sticking to their scenario of a proclamation with the committee's cooperation – omits to mention this. So it seems to me that Sukarno and Hatta were indeed determined to go ahead irrespective of whether they succeeded in obtaining the hoped-for assurances of Japanese non-intervention. B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:77 – differently from 1961:82) suggests that Subardjo had left instructions to meet at Maeda's residence before leaving for Rengasdengklok. This is contrary to what Subardjo himself says, however. Besides, the delegates from Celebes later testified that they had been dragged from their beds in the middle of the night (NIOD 006017).

The question then remains whether Sukarno and Hatta disregarded Nishimura's words because of *pemuda* pressure (Dahm 1969:113). In view of the resoluteness with which they withstood all threats by the *pemuda* up to that point, this seems most unlikely. Roem (1970:52) also concludes that the two proclaimed independence without bending to the will of the *pemuda*.

Several authors who apparently do not have a very high opinion of Sukarno and Hatta's courage vis-à-vis the Japanese (like De Kadt 1989:89; Smit 1952:45-6; Jones 1954:381; Groen 1985:94; and, very recently, Van Poelgeest 1999:25) put forward the view that Nishimura in fact gave his consent, or in any case a not unequivocal refusal (Sluimers 1965:159). Hatta (1970:52)

¹² Kahin 1952:136 (who, like Woodman, 1955:197, says that the Japanese arrested Rear-Admiral Maeda, at whose residence the proclamation was drafted, though I could not find any confirmation of this in the archives); Nugroho Notosusanto 1979:134; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto 1984b:83; Salim Said 1991:10.

reports that Nishimura invited them to a meeting by telephone, which might be taken as a sign of the latter's willingness to oblige. In point of fact, Nishimura's invitation was only issued in compliance with a request by Rear-Admiral Maeda (NIOD 006837, 006900; ARA AS 5204-18:6, 5207:1; Nishijima and Kishi Kōichi 1963:502; Nishijima 1986:320), to whom the Indonesian leaders had expressed their hope of Japanese neutrality. Nishimura, when interviewed by Gotō (1984:12) in 1983, told the same story.

Brunsveld van Hulten (ARA AS 5204-13:8) and Dahm (1969:314, 1971:112) focus on Nishimura's leniency on one point at the end of the meeting, after adamantly refusing all the Indonesians' requests. Nakatani, the interpreter at this meeting, told Allied interrogators in 1946 that when Sukarno at the last moment asked permission for calling a meeting of the members of the Independence Preparatory Committee – although he had in fact already done so – Nishimura repeated that it was impossible to give such permission, but that if the meeting was just a private gathering he would not interfere (NIOD 059326-II:68). According to the statements of Captain Nakamura, another Japanese who was present at the interview, Nishimura's words were that if the meeting was a private tea party, he would have no business meddling (ARA AS 5207:3). Miyoshi, a third Japanese participant in the discussions, stated during his interrogation that he had understood that Nishimura could not allow such a private meeting to take place, but could not forbid it either (NIOD 005847). Despite Sukarno's assurances that the meeting was intended merely to inform those concerned of the results of his interview with Nishimura, rather than as a regular Committee meeting, it was precisely at this private gathering that the proclamation was drafted and discussed and the definite text was decided on, to be announced a few hours later. In my opinion the fact should not be overlooked that, if Nishimura in fact had no objection to a private gathering, as suggested, he was quite explicit in his opposition to the proclamation of independence. So even if Sukarno and Hatta picked up the alleged hint about the tea party (which neither in fact mentions), they still did not have the desired guarantee of a peaceful proclamation procedure. Accordingly Zorab (1954:119), Aziz (1955:257), and De Graaf (1959:322) – who as far as I was able to find out were the first to refer to these reports in the literature – like Roem (1970:38), attach little importance to, or even ignore, Nishimura's alleged complaisance on this point. Moreover, during the subsequent interrogations Nishimura himself several times most vehemently denied having dropped any hint that tea parties and the like would be tolerated (ARA AS 5205-24:1, 5205-25:1, 5205-39:1). This is confirmed by Maeda (ARA AS 5204-15), from whom Nishijima (ARA AS 5204-18:7) also heard that the discussions did not proceed very smoothly. Maeda told the latter that Nishimura only agreed to bringing the opening meeting of the Independence Preparatory Committee forward one day (although ac-

ording to the records he refused to do this as well¹³). Possibly Nakatani answered Sukarno's question in Indonesian – which only Nakamura and Miyoshi, the two other Japanese present at the meeting who confirmed his account (see above), were able to understand – of his own accord in the process of interpreting.¹⁴

The assumption that Sukarno and Hatta proceeded to proclaim independence after Nishimura had dropped some sort of hint has nevertheless become widespread in Western literature (as; for instance, very recently, Giebels 1999:354; exceptions to this are Kahin 1952:136; Penders 1974:95, 1997:135; De Bruin 1982:198; and Friend 1988:119), as opposed to the majority of Indonesian publications¹⁵. In 1972 both B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:80) and Legge (1972:200-1) – followed by many others, like Reid (1974:27), D.Ch. Anderson (1976:73), Rimmelink (1978:53), L. de Jong (1985:1038, notwithstanding the presence of documents at his Institute for War Documentation which De Graaf had already made accessible in 1959), J.J.P. de Jong (1988:50), and De Vletter, Voskuil, and Van Diessen (1997:74) – pointed out that Nishimura said that he could not agree to any proposal by Sukarno about anything he knew about, but that anything might be permissible if done without his knowledge. Legge (1972:204) and Reid (1974:29) assume that the Japanese were lenient in view of the kidnapping, which made them apprehensive about a general descent into anarchy. The question remains, however, whether Nishimura really was so accommodating.

B.R.O'G. Anderson bases his view on the dictated reminiscences of Naka-

¹³ See also De Graaf 1959:322. The literature puts forward different views regarding the date decided on by the Japanese authorities: 17 August (ARA AS 5205-33:28), 18 August (ARA AS 5205-24:1, 5205-39:1; Sidik Kertapati 1964:114; Kanahale 1967:219; B.R.O'G. Anderson 1972:63; Dahm 1969:310; Reid 1974:21; Nishijima 1986:314), and 19 August (ARA AS 5205-37:14, 5208(b):4; NIOD 005847; Overdijkink 1946:41, 46; Sjahrir 1949:253; Kahin 1952:127; Jones 1954:381; Aziz 1955:249; *War History Series* 1976:8). According to NIOD 006016, ARA AS 5207:1, De Graaf 1959:306, and L. de Jong 1985:1032, 18 August was chosen for the Committee's opening ceremony (Legge 1972:193), and 19 August for its first conference. This accords with the Japanese army's announcement (*Asia Raya* 4-195, 14 August 2605). Sukarno explained on the occasion of the installation of the Komite Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Committee) on 29 August 1945 that the session of the Independence Preparatory Committee, initially due to start on 19 August, had been advanced one day (*Asia Raya* 4-210, 30 August 2605).

¹⁴ Hatta (1970:56) claims he criticized Nishimura severely during the interview (and as a result Roem, 1970:51, praises him for being more of a *samurai* than the *samurai*), but expected that the interpreter would tone down his attack. Indeed, neither NIOD 059326-II nor ARA AS 5207 mentions this. Nishijima also admitted having given extra information in the course of interpreting on other occasions (see footnote 9). Friend (1988:119) heard from Hatta that Sukarno challenged Nishimura to commit *hara-kiri*.

¹⁵ An exception is Barlan Setiadijaya (1992:14), referring to Subardjo, who was not present at the interview, however, and says something quite the opposite, leaning on Hatta (Subardjo 1972:105). Another exception is Aboe Bakar Loebis (1995:103), who probably based himself on Anderson.

tani and Nishijima published in 1950. To me, however, Nakatani's account here, if not contradicting Nishimura's reply as rendered by Nakatani himself in his report of 1946, which was confirmed by both Nakamura and Miyoshi, seems to stretch its sense enormously. It is regrettable that this report has not received the attention it deserves (B.R.O'G. Anderson, 1961:78, is well aware of the tea party story, but derived this from De Graaf). Nishijima and Kishi Kōichi (1963:479, 503, 510-1) conspicuously pay no attention at all to the Nakatani version of 1950. Nakatani's suggestion in 1950 that the Japanese hinted at support for the Indonesians during the interview is of course quite understandable in view of the tendency among Japanese who served in Indonesia to focus after the war on the importance of Japan's contribution to Indonesian independence and on the deep sympathy of the Japanese for the Indonesian cause (Gotō 1984:39).¹⁶ Nishimura himself, however, was adamant in his denial that he dropped any hint (see above). Though admitting in an interview in 1983 that he had felt in 1945 that it would have been all right for the Indonesians to declare independence unilaterally on their own, as Gotō (1984:13-4) points out, he insisted that the Japanese no longer had any say in the matter (see also the interview in Bosdriesz and Soeteman 1985:41). If Nishimura could perhaps be suspected of not telling the truth shortly after the war, in view of the possibility of prosecution by the Allies, in 1983 the situation was totally different and there was no longer any reason to obscure the truth. On the contrary, admitting B.R.O'G. Anderson's construction on his words would fit in well with the above-mentioned Japanese tendency to stress that they not only led the Indonesians to independence, but also contributed to the proclamation of independence itself. Essential in this context is the fact that Nishimura's immediate superior, Major-General Yamamoto (the Gunseikan, or Superintendent of the Military Administration, and concurrently Sambōchō, or Chief of Staff of the 16th Army), while also claiming that the Japanese Military Administration played a significant role in the independence of Indonesia, according to Gotō (1984:15-6), in 1979 distanced himself from Nishimura. Yamamoto suggested that if he had conducted the negotiations, he would have given a more flexible response, allowing considerable latitude¹⁷ – while Nishimura (ARA AS 5205-23:2) had

¹⁶ Saitō Shizuo's reminiscences, for example, though also asserting that Nishimura's reply was stiff, suggest that it nevertheless contained 'a subtle hint that there was nothing to be done about it if it [the proclamation of independence] were made in circumstances having nothing to do with the Japanese Forces'. Gotō (1984:13-4) is rather sceptical about this and believes that Nishimura's statement was more candid and frank.

¹⁷ Another interesting example of portraying the Japanese in a favourable, altruistic light in retrospect is provided by Miyamoto (1986:325-7), who censures Maeda for informing the Indonesians of Japan's surrender on the 16th (see footnote 9) without consulting the army. If he had not done this, the army in Miyamoto's opinion would have been able to offer the Indonesians the best conditions for independence until the evening of 18 August, when the official

very cautiously observed the principle of maintaining the status quo with the Gunseikan's decision about this in mind!

Nishijima was not present at the interview with Nishimura at all (see footnote 11). He concluded from what he heard about this from his chief, Maeda, however, that in helping the Indonesians, 'the only things we had to be cautious about were that the measures taken should not appear to be associated with Japan in any way' (Nishijima 1986:321). Perhaps this personal opinion of Nishijima's was erroneously projected onto Nishimura in the reminiscences, as though it were he who had given expression to this particular sentiment. Although revealing Japanese involvement in the formulation of the Independence Proclamation for the sake of protecting their own interests, in an interview in 1984 Nishijima repeated unconditionally that Nishimura had refused the Indonesians all assistance (Nishijima 1988:96).

In B.R.O'G. Anderson's view, Nishimura's tacit promise not to interfere was prompted by sympathy with Indonesian aspirations for independence and by the desire to fulfil the strong moral obligation to the Indonesians in view of the Greater East Asia Prosperity ideal which the Japanese had propagated and the Japanese promise to make Indonesia independent. Contrary to what Anderson claims, however, Nishimura did not belong to the category of Japanese who wished to support the Indonesian cause after Japan's surrender (ARA AS 5205-36:12-5; Zorab 1954:121; Friend 1988:219; a different view is put forward by Van der Wal, 1972:575). In fact, he felt that continued support for Indonesian independence was tantamount to continuing the fighting against the Allies. Very illuminating in this respect is the report of an argument between him and Maeda (ARA AS 5204-13-9-10, 5205-36:21-2; Roem 1970:43-5). Nishimura's lack of sympathy for the Indonesians according to Yamamoto was due to the fact that he had only been in Indonesia nine months (Gotō 1984:15; see also Miyamoto 1973:53). In any case, even if the 1950 version is correct, the complaisance of the Japanese should be interpreted as a goodwill gesture, the reason being that the supposed drafting of an independence proclamation of which they knew nothing made it possible for them to deny any responsibility vis-à-vis their superiors and the Allies, and

confirmation of the surrender was received, as it was not under any obligation to maintain the status quo until then, in his view. Independence could then have been proclaimed on the 19th. Miyamoto totally overlooks the fact, however, that the Indonesians were in a great hurry, as there were rumours that the Allies would land on the 20th (ARA AS 5204-18:9). To me it seems quite improbable that the army would have been able to achieve anything much in support of the Indonesians in the three days in which, according to Miyamoto, it could have legally done so. On the contrary, on 16 August it decided to disband the PETA and *heihō*, if necessary by force – note well, at the suggestion of Miyamoto (1973:50) himself! Besides, Miyamoto's superior, Yamamoto, according to his memoirs, had not waited for the official news either when he informally informed Sukarno and Hatta of the surrender early in the morning of the 18th (Gotō 1984:16; ARA AS 5205-33:28, 5205-39:4; *War History Series* 1976:10).

certainly not that they were impressed by the threat of an attack by the *pemuda*, as is evident from the records.

So our conclusion must be that if the *pemuda* tried hard in many ways to influence the course of events around the proclamation of independence, they did so with little if any effect. Their sole achievement was participation in the discussions about the wording of the proclamation. However, as Sidik Kertapati (1964:111) notes, these discussions took place at the residence of Japanese Rear-Admiral Maeda to prevent possible interference from the Japanese army. In view of their rejection of Japanese involvement, the *pemuda* obviously lost the fight in this respect as well, therefore (Reid 1974:28). Moreover, they failed in their ambition to have a phrase about the forcible seizure of government institutions included in the text.¹⁸ Again, they failed to seize the power from the Japanese twice after the proclamation of independence.¹⁹ Although he seems to have forgotten this in 1983, when he stated that the Japanese had had no thought of checking the Indonesian movement by using their forces (Gotō 1984:14), Nishimura after the meeting with Sukarno and Hatta instructed the Japanese army authorities to take the necessary precautions (ARA AS 5205-25:1, 5205-39:1). As a result, as Cribb (1991:57) observes, the obstacles to revolution in urban Jakarta proved insuperable. For this reason the proclamation was made at Sukarno's residence at Pegangsaan Timur rather than at the big Ikada Square (formerly Koningsplein and currently Medan Merdeka).²⁰ As it turned out, fully armed Japan-

¹⁸ Adam Malik 1975:65; Subardjo 1972:111; Hatta 1970:58; Nishijima 1986:322, 1988:96. According to Giebels (1999:355), referring to the latter, it was Miyoshi who intervened on this point, although Nishijima (1986:322) does not say anything about this. In B.R.O'G. Anderson's view (1972:82) the passage about the revolutionary seizure of power was omitted from the text because of the alleged deal with Nishimura. Nishijima says (Bosdriesz and Soeteman 1985:41), differently from the sources referred to here, that the wording 'the transfer of power will be carried out as soon as possible' was substituted for 'the transfer of power will be attempted as soon as possible' due to *pemuda* influence. Sidik Kertapati (1964:116), however, simply points out that someone proposed the relevant amendment without saying that this was one of the *pemuda*. It could have been one of the members of the Independence Preparatory Committee who were present. Kahin (1952:136) claims that after the meeting with Nishimura, Sjahrir visited Sukarno to discuss the wording of the proclamation. However, Sukarno returned to Maeda's residence straight from Nishimura's, without meeting anyone.

¹⁹ Adam Malik 1975:52-4; Nasution 1977a:213. Legge (1972:200), contrary to these, assumes that the final unsuccessful attempt was made on 16 August. Cribb remarkably makes no mention of these abortive attempts.

²⁰ Sidik Kertapati 1964:107-8, 117; Aidit as referred to in B.R.O'G. Anderson 1961:85; Roem 1970:39; Subardjo 1972:114; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto 1984b:86. De Graaf (1959:325) and Giebels (1999:356, referring to Kanahela, although I was not able to find anything about this in Kanahela 1967) claim that Maeda tipped the Indonesians off. Van Poelgeest (1999:25) gives a quite different explanation, saying that the Japanese prohibited the proclamation at Ikada Square but gave permission for this at Pegangsaan Timur. From the available records it is evident, however, that the Japanese did not give any permission for the proclama-

ese troops were in control of the square on 17 August (Sudiro 1974:28; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto 1984b:90; De Graaf 1959:324-5). Minarsih Soedarpo (1998:63) reminisces how the unusual number of army trucks with heavily armed Japanese soldiers in the streets was the only indication that something special had happened that day. In fact, as Oemar Bahsan writes (1955:63-4), when a few days later the PETA was disarmed and disbanded²¹, the Japanese army was ready for battle and moved to take up positions near the PETA garrisons.²² So Sukarno and Hatta were quite justified in their efforts to avoid antagonizing the Japanese.

On 19 September (Kahin 1952:137 creates the impression that it was 19 August) the *pemuda*, out of frustration at their failure to wrest the power from the Japanese, called on the population to assemble for a mass rally on Ikada

tion whatsoever. The Indonesians at Pegangsaan Timur were therefore ready to beat off the Japanese if they should attack, but the latter arrived too late (Adams 1965:218, 221; Sidik Kertapati 1964:118; Sudiro 1974:29, 33; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto 1984b:90-1). Probably only Maeda knew about Pegangsaan Timur (De Vletter, Voskuil, and Van Diessen 1997:75).

²¹ According to Kahin (1952:137) PETA units, where they were not too far outnumbered, resisted their disarmament and clashed with the Japanese in large parts of Java. Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1972:8) mentions only two places where they were not disarmed; Sokowidi (Banyuwangi) and Pelabuhan Ratu (Sukabumi). Larson (1970:260) reports that the PETA in Salatiga kept its arms, whereas Reid (1974:34) assumes that only near Djakarta did a few PETA men desert with their arms. Nugroho Notosusanto (1979:135) says, on the other hand, that all PETA units without exception were disarmed by the Japanese.

²² As Bouwer (1988:378) reports, the Japanese in Bandung disarmed the PETA in a heavy-handed way, using full battle equipment. These military actions belie the claim that the Japanese disarmed and disbanded the PETA in the interests of the Indonesians themselves, as made by Miyamoto Shizuō (as referred to by Goto, 1976:68) in 1973. Assuming that the Allies would recognize Indonesian independence, the Japanese deemed it advisable that Indonesia should not have any arms, in Miyamoto's view, as this might damage its image as a peace-loving nation! This is another remarkable example of presenting Japanese measures in a favourable, altruistic light in retrospect. Miyamoto contradicts himself elsewhere, however, where he explains (1986:327) that the Japanese disarmed the PETA for fear of a clash with them (see also Tsuchiya in Bosdriesz and Soeteman 1985:43) and that they were prepared to impose their decision accordingly by force if necessary (Miyamoto 1973:51; *War History Series* 1976:9). Giebels (1999:371) puts forward the unusually favourable Dutch view vis-à-vis the Japanese that they disbanded the PETA and *heihō* to prevent the Allies from treating them as francs tireurs. According to Sidik Kertapati (1964:126-7), however, it was the Indonesians who were afraid of being taken for francs tireurs and therefore tried to ensure the PETA's disbandment. B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:102) suggests that the Japanese had led them to believe this so as to make sure their disarmament proceeded smoothly. On 19 August the Independence Preparatory Committee, rejecting a policy of war, expressed the unanimous wish that the Japanese should quickly dissolve the PETA and *heihō* officially (Yamin 1959:463). The Japanese did not do so in compliance with this wish, however, as they took the decision accordingly three days earlier (Miyamoto 1973:50; *War History Series* 1976:8). Dahm (1971:115) overlooks this circumstance, saying that the Japanese took this decision because of PETA attacks after 17 August 1945. Oemar Bahsan's report also contradicts Cribb's statement (1984:69) that all Japanese troops in the area were rapidly disarmed and most were killed.

Square in yet another attempt at forcing a showdown with the Japanese (Tan Malaka 1998:167). The Japanese troops, surrounding the square, trained their machine guns on the crowds, however. And so the stage seemed set for a massive confrontation, as Cribb (1984:75, 1991:61-2) puts it, likely to end in hundreds, if not thousands of casualties and sweeping away the republic in the process. Sukarno (Adams 1965:224-5) years later boasted that he had convened the rally, whereas according to Adam Malik (1975:94) and Tan Malaka (1998:168-70) he instructed the *pemuda* to cancel it; in view of a Japanese prohibition on such gatherings, which the *pemuda* refused. After also trying in vain to persuade the Japanese to allow the meeting by warning them that otherwise Hatta and he would resign²³, Sukarno could not but go to the rally and address the assembled crowd. When he arrived at the square, he was approached by a Japanese officer (Subardjo 1978:374; Aboe Bakar Loebis 1995:129; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto 1984b:102), staff officer Miyamoto (Bosdriesz and Soeteman 1985:49), who warned him not to incite the crowd to riot. Miyamoto had rushed to the scene for fear of a clash between the Indonesians and the Japanese troops (Miyamoto 1973:71, 1986:329-30; *War History Series* 1976:11), which indicates that such a clash was indeed imminent. In a short speech, which later he was to call his 'State of the Union address', Sukarno ordered the crowd to disperse, after explaining that he had given orders for the meeting to be cancelled and that he had only come because he had no alternative (for the text of this speech, see B.R.O'G. Anderson 1972:123). I personally am therefore inclined to assume, like Bower (1988:403), that Miyamoto ordered Sukarno to adopt this course. The *pemuda* thus provided Sukarno with the opportunity, though unintentionally, to give a convincing show of his authority. The crowd obeyed the order and the showdown with the Japanese did not eventuate. Although this is generally not explicitly recognized in the history books, Sukarno had prevented another blood bath (Giebels, 1999:381, is the first to say so explicitly). Adam Malik (1975:95) and Sidik Kertapati (1964:139), omitting to mention that the rally was intended as a showdown with the Japanese, do not concede that it was a failure, but claim that it was important in unifying the many different groups in society, impressing the significance of the independence that had just been proclaimed on them and giving them self-confidence and determination (see also Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto 1984b:102).

²³ Both Adam Malik and Tan Malaka mention that Sukarno threatened to resign as President. According to Tan Malaka, Sukarno's government protested against the Japanese ban, which is corroborated by Japanese sources (ARA AS 5205-33:31, 5208(a):5), whereas Adam Malik claims that the threat was directed against the *pemuda* in order to make them cancel the meeting. B.R.O'G. Anderson (1961:123-4), who is unaware of the Japanese sources, attaches more credence to the latter view. Soebadio Sastrosatomo (1988:111, followed by Giebels 1999:380) and Aboe Bakar Loebis (1995:127) write in the same vein, though they are probably just repeating Adam Malik. I assume that the threat was directed at both the Japanese and the *pemuda*.

Under these circumstances the British forces were able to land safely in Jakarta, without meeting with Indonesian resistance, on 29 September (Doulton 1951:250; Woodman 1955:208; Woodburn Kirby 1969:314, 319-20). The subsequent landings in Padang, Medan, Semarang²⁴, Palembang, and Biliton in the next weeks²⁵, and in Bangka, Bali and Lombok even in 1946²⁶, went smoothly because of similar circumstances and met with no Indonesian opposition. This is a rather neglected fact in the historical sources. Only in Surabaya did the Indonesians try to prevent Brigadier Mallaby's 49th Indian Brigade from landing (Woodburn Kirby 1969:322; Parera 1982:65; Gani 1984:73). As it turned out, the Japanese were no longer militarily in control there. But for President Sukarno's intervention (by telephone), the Indonesians would even have opened fire on the approaching Allied flotilla, which they initially mistook for ships surrendered to them by the Japanese.²⁷ Indeed, the convoy was led by a Japanese gunboat (Pugh 1948:322). Squire's (1979:59) contention that 'it was not the Japanese presence which was to cause trouble for the Allied forces in the post surrender period, but the absence of Japanese forces from their operational areas' was true only for Surabaya. Despite instructions from the Indonesian government in Jakarta to cooperate with the Allies, heavy fighting broke out in Surabaya shortly after the landing. It was there and then that the *pemuda* (the meaning of which word by this time had changed, see Reid 1986:188; Frederick 1989:151-2, 261)

²⁴ See *Dokumentasi Pemuda* 1948:40; Sidik Kertapati 1964:159. The Gurkhas, after landing in Semarang, met with a favourable reception from the Indonesians, who regarded their coming as an act of Providence, preventing the Japanese, who had begun the Battle of Semarang, from taking further action against the Indonesians (*Sejarah Pertempuran* 1977:190). The Gurkhas suffered a few casualties when Japanese troops mistook them for Indonesians, however (Doulton 1951:246; Mullaly 1957:390; Woodburn Kirby 1969:320-1). Van Mook (Van der Wal 1971:407), Smit (1952:64), and probably also J.J.P. de Jong (1986:170) assume that this was an incident between the Gurkhas and the Indonesians. Groen (1985:116, 118-9), in her evaluation of the Japanese military action, seems inclined to conclude that it would have been better if the Japanese in Semarang had allowed the Indonesians to disarm them, overlooking the fact that in that case the Gurkhas would most likely have had to face a similar situation to that in Surabaya (Tull 1995:102) and would not have been able to proceed to Ambarawa and Magelang (see Sidik-Kertapati 1964:158; Salim Said 1986:51).

²⁵ For Padang, Medan, and Palembang, see Van Mook 1949:98; Mountbatten 1969:299; Woodburn Kirby 1969:356-7; Sluimers 1965:164; Van der Wal 1971:348; for Medan, in particular Jacobs 1982:239-41; and for Biliton, Van der Wal 1971:424, 1972:486, 512. Cribb and Brown (1995:21), on the other hand, like Smit (1952:64), believe that the Allied landing was unopposed only in some places.

²⁶ For Bangka, see Woodburn Kirby 1969:359, and Van der Wal 1973:393; for Bali and Lombok, Mountbatten 1969:309, and Woodburn Kirby 1969:344. In Bali the Japanese army under Lieutenant-Colonel Nomura, sent by 16th Army Headquarters (ARA AS 5205-37:6), protected the landing area (Van der Wal 1973:580-9). In Lombok the landing forces even staged a victory march to Mataram (Van der Wal 1973:659). Van Poelgeest (1999:43) believes that Bali and Lombok were occupied already in October 1945.

²⁷ Gani 1984:73-4, followed by Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:344-5. Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1972:54, 1987:26) does not mention Sukarno's intervention in connection with the approach of the flotilla.

experienced their finest hour. Indirectly, as we will see, this brings us to the third major Indonesian day of commemoration: Hari Pahlawan, or Heroes' Day, on 10 November.

At 6 a.m. on 10 November 1945 (Broeshart et al., 1997:53, say it was the 11th) the British launched a military campaign in Surabaya, starting from the port area, with the aim of occupying that town, which culminated in the Battle of Surabaya. Differently from Wehl (1948:67), who considers this battle important in British military history (though Carver 1998 makes no mention of it) as the last battle to be fought by Indian army units under British command (which is overlooking the role of the Indian army in other places, such as Bandung, Semarang, Magelang, and Ambarawa), I believe it to be important because it was the biggest battle to be fought by the British shortly after World War II, not only in Indonesia (as Nugroho Notosusanto, 1995:V, asserts), but in the whole of Southeast Asia, if not worldwide. As far as I was able to find out, nowhere did the British put such a huge force into action in so small an area after the surrender of Japan. Accordingly, it was the biggest and bloodiest battle fought by the Indonesians after the proclamation of their independence, which was never equalled in their subsequent struggle against the Dutch (Wehl 1948:67; Reid 1974:53). One Indonesian source (*Dokumentasi Pemuda* 1948:63) cites a Japanese as stating that the Battle of Surabaya was twice as violent as the Japanese attack on Shanghai – the fiercest Japanese assault on a Chinese city – though to my mind this is in contradiction with the facts (on the Battle of Shanghai, see Wilson 1983:30-48).

On 10 November the British deployed the 5th Indian Division – comprising two infantry brigades with artillery and three divisional infantry battalions – commanded by Major-General Mansergh, who also had the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 23rd Indian Division under his command²⁸, in

²⁸ Kahin (1952:144) and Abu Hanifah (1972:153) put forward the view that the British deployed one and a half divisions. Barlan Setiadijaya (1992:493) says they used one complete division reinforced with the 49th Indian Brigade. Friend (1988:228) assumes that 6,000 Seaforth Highlanders took part in the operation in addition to the 5th Indian Division. According to Woodburn Kirby (1969:314, 319) the Seaforth Highlanders (not comprising 6,000 men) were in Djakarta, however. On the 5th Indian Division's order of battle, see Woodburn Kirby 1969:525. The third Indian infantry brigade of this Division remained temporarily in Malaya, only to replace the 49th Indian Infantry Brigade in Surabaya on 28 November 1945, when the latter was transferred to Semarang (Woodburn Kirby 1969:322, 335). When it came under Mansergh's command, the 49th Brigade included only two of its three battalions, the third (6/5th Mahrattas) being transferred to Batavia and temporarily replaced by one of the three divisional infantry battalions (Doulton 1951:265). Woodburn Kirby (1969:338), in his description of the order of battle of the 49th Brigade in Semarang (which most remarkably also included a Japanese battalion, Kido Butai), omits to mention one of its two original battalions (5/6th Rajputana Rifles). As Parrott (1975:110) points out, the notion that the 49th Brigade was made up of Gurkhas rests on a general misunderstanding (see, for example, Giebels 1999:388).

Surabaya. They were supported by the air force and by naval artillery, as well as by Stuart light tanks and eventually also Sherman medium tanks! Dutch authorities of the highest level, both in The Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies, therefore expected that the British would clear Surabaya within a few days (Van der Wal 1972:47, 52). They still seriously underrated the Indonesians and believed that a few whiffs of grapeshot would restore authority (Reid 1974:53; Squire 1979:124). Despite this huge striking force, it took the British 19 days instead to occupy the town!²⁹

As Doulton (1951:265) puts it, wherever the British pressed firmly, the Indonesians gave way, but as a result of the concern to avoid unnecessary casualties through careful planning and a skilful conduct of the operations, progress was not fast. It was Mansergh's intention in fact to put off the use of force, to strike in only one area at a time, and to introduce breaks in the operations to give the Indonesians a chance to contact him (Rajendra Singh 1958:230-1). Other authors give similar explanations for the delay, but also emphasize that the British met with strong resistance from the Indonesians, who at times launched suicidal attacks and, despite heavy losses, refused to give up the struggle (Pugh 1948:349; Woodburn Kirby 1969:335-6). As Wehl (1948:66) indicates, progress was also slow owing to the difficult nature of street fighting. The history of the 5th Indian Division (Brett-James 1951:455-8) indeed confirms that the close-quarter kind of street fighting in Surabaya was a form of warfare that was new to this division. It also points out that the Indonesians, like the Japanese who had trained them, were often ready to fight to the last. Although the British Indian forces initially were ordered to use only their personal weapons, permission soon had to be given to use mortars, as the Indonesians were inflicting considerable casualties on the slowly advancing troops. Five hours after the start of the offensive it became clear that further advance would not be possible without the risk of heavy casualties, and so Mansergh gave orders for support from the artillery and the Royal Navy ships and for bombing by the Royal Air Force. One brigade

²⁹ See also Woodburn Kirby 1969:335; Brett-James 1951:456, 458; Nugroho Notokusanto 1995: 142; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto 1984b:116. A notable exception is Penders (1974: 105), who says that the city was occupied after two days. According to Zwaan (1985:113) the operation was completed within eight days. Wolf (1948:22), Van Mook (1949:99), Smit (1952:64), and Kahin (1952:144) believe that the campaign took only ten days. Dahm (1971:121) and Nasution (1977b:353, 392) claim that it lasted fourteen or fifteen days. Frederick (1989:279) gives the suggestion that the battle was over on 26 November, while Pugh (1948:349) speaks of a duration of five weeks. Most Indonesian sources cited here, like several Western authors, simply say that the battle lasted three weeks. Barlan Setiadijaya (1992:535, followed by Broeshart 1987:32) reports fighting in the last part of Gunungsari on 29 and 30 November, contradicting himself on p. 542, where he quotes Nugroho Notokusanto as saying that this area had already fallen on the 28th. Osman Raliby (1953:129), *Sain Karya Bhirawa Anoraga* (1968:32), and Broeshart et al. (1997:53) also say that the battle lasted till 1 December.

repelled the fiercest onslaughts, whereby masses of young Indonesians fell before its machine guns. Continuous sniping made the task of digging in both difficult and perilous.

Although these British accounts are very frank and unambiguous about the enormous tenacity with which the Indonesians resisted the British advance, they do not specify the feats of the Indonesians, only saying that they constantly gave way. As details like this are usually omitted in Western studies, it is worthwhile looking at the Indonesian sources to see what they have to say in this respect.

On 11 November a British Indian unit was ambushed and annihilated at Kresek (Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:116). The telegraph office there changed hands three times (Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:108; Nasution 1977b:380; Oey Hong Lee 1981:45). According to a report issued by the Indonesian Governor of East Java on 17 November 1945, the Indonesians had driven the British back to a line running from Dupak to the area behind the Internatio building and further back towards Pegirian.³⁰ A few other sources mention that on 23 November the Indonesians even succeeded against all odds in getting the whole of the city under their control again!³¹ They damaged several British tanks, sometimes very spectacularly jumping on them and throwing grenades into them.³² They moreover succeeded in hitting a British plane (according to other sources more planes were hit or brought down, the number mounting to thirteen in the course of the battle). Some authors even claim that the English division's artillery commander, Brigadier R.G. Loder-Symonds (who was Commander of the Royal Artillery in the Battle of Arnhem, see Urquhart 1958:219), was shot and killed.³³ The warships in the port were harassed by Indonesian shelling.³⁴ The history of the 5th Indian Division does not men-

³⁰ Heru Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991:120; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:555; Sudarno 1993:76. According to Osman Raliby (1952:73, 1953:102-3) the British were even pushed back to Morokrempangan and Tanjung Perak. These feats are not mentioned in Nugroho Notosusanto 1995, however.

³¹ Osman Raliby 1952:78, 1953:116; *Peranan TNI* 1965:93; *Sam Karya Bhirawa Anoraga* 1968:32; Heru Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991:120. This is not confirmed by Nugroho Notosusanto 1995.

³² Osman Raliby 1953:102; Sidik Kertapati 1964:158; Nasution 1977b:380, 400; Parera 1982:90; Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:121, 124, 134-6; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:501, 520. See also Van Mook 1950:212.

³³ Nasution 1977b:381, 391; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:496, 508. According to Parera (1982:84) more than ten planes were hit, while Osman Raliby (1952:73, 1953:86, 101) mentions a figure of thirteen. Sidik Kertapati (1964:158), on the other hand, speaks of only two, and Nugroho Notosusanto (1995:109) of only one, without mentioning that the Brigadier was in this plane. Broeshart (1987:30, see also Broeshart et al. 1997:53), interestingly, appears to believe that the Brigadier was shot down, whereas according to Osman Raliby (1952:57) the news about this turned out to be incorrect. According to Brett-James (1951:456) the Brigadier's aircraft crashed because it failed to rise.

³⁴ Sidik Kertapati 1964:158; Nasution 1977b:399; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:533, 555, 593; Sudarno 1993:76. This is not mentioned in Nugroho Notosusanto 1995, however.

tion the number of casualties suffered by it during the battle, but Parrott (1977:81) calculates this at around 166, which, though not high when compared with the casualties suffered in the fighting against the Japanese in Burma, was certainly considerable, as the war was supposed to have ended for the British, after all.

The Indonesian successes as reported by these sources notwithstanding, they did not manage to drive the British out of Surabaya. On the contrary, it was they themselves who were pushed out of the town, or in plain words, were utterly defeated. Surabaya was the first city in Java and Sumatra not to have a Republican civil administration, as the British did not permit it to be reinstated there, differently from elsewhere (Van Mook 1949:99).

The Indonesian losses were heavy. The British at the end of the campaign counted 1,618 Indonesians dead and estimated the total number of Indonesian casualties at 4,697 (Woodburn Kirby 1969:336). Other sources mention a figure of 6,000 losses.³⁵ Besides, the city was devastated, with numerous buildings, like the former Palace of Justice, being reduced to rubble by the shelling or bombing.³⁶ As the town was lost to the Indonesians, never to be recaptured by them in the subsequent struggle for independence, the question arises whether the *pemuda* actions here ended in complete failure for a second time, as in August, in a battle which Nasution (1977b:353-4) describes as the first and biggest battle launched by the Indonesian masses.³⁷

A British observer, Wehl (1948:67), passed a scathing judgement on the Battle of Surabaya, stating that from the Indonesian point of view it was a complete waste of time, of life, of ammunition, and of property. Most surprisingly, no less a person than Nasution (1977b:358, 401, 1980:22) shares this

³⁵ According to Pugh (1948:338) and Brett-James (1951:450), 6,000 was the Indonesian estimate. See, for example, Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:79 (who simply totted up the two figures of the British); L. de Jong 1988:725; Broeshart et al. 1997:52; Boer 1997:224. According to Squire (1979: 126) the estimated Indonesian casualties were 6,000-20,000, while *Sam Karya Bhirawa Anoraga* (1968:32) and Heru Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati (1991:121) even speak of 60,000!

³⁶ Roeslan Abdulgani 1975 includes a photo of the ruins of this building, explaining in the caption that this was what remained after the people stormed the Japanese Kempeitai entrenched in it earlier in October 1945. See also Broeshart 1987:13; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:525. In fact, the building was only totally ravaged by British shelling in November (Wehl 1948:65; Frederick 1989:228; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:160, who contradicts himself on p. 525, however; Sudarno 1993:76; Broeshart et al. 1997:490; Boer 1997:208).

³⁷ The battle that started on 10 November 1945 was indeed the biggest battle fought by the Indonesians, though not their first major battle, which Nasution (1977a:354) identifies as the Battle of Semarang (14-19 October 1945). Besides, it is questionable in the extreme whether the initiative for the battle of 10 November was taken by the Indonesians. Nor, as Frederick (1989:279) points out, were the Indonesian masses involved in it (for a different view see Reid 1974:53; also Kahin 1952:144; Lucas 1988:155). Nasution (1980:22), contrary to this, regards all battles fought by the Indonesians in the cities at the time as mass actions, though by 'masses' he presumably means irregulars.

damning view, also being most negative about the military importance of the battle for the Indonesians. He even speaks of the Battle of Surabaya as a *ben-cana*, or disaster! In his opinion the *semangat* (fighting spirit) shown by the Indonesians during this battle was enormous, but they were doomed nevertheless to total defeat. He points out that *semangat* alone is never enough: it should be organized and directed and should also be combined with planning and skill. As this was not the case³⁸, the Indonesians lost not only the town, but also huge amounts of equipment that was invaluable for waging war as well as for reconstruction, and suffered several thousand casualties. Nasution refers to Japanese figures indicating that there were 40,000 weapons in Surabaya at the time.

How disastrous he deemed the loss of arms in Surabaya and other cities may be inferred from his remarks elsewhere. According to him a well-organized army could have been equipped with these arms if the Indonesian government had pursued a different policy – though I personally doubt if Sukarno and Hatta are to blame for this omission³⁹ – which would not have allowed the Indonesians to become so hopelessly split into so many different fighting groups each operating independently under its own leader (*bapakism*). The government should have recruited the adequately trained former PETA and KNIL troops and *heihō* (Indonesian auxiliary troops of the Japanese army) and equipped these with the large number of weapons which according to Japanese estimates were taken from the Japanese: 10,000 in Sumatra, 10,000 in West Java, and 30,000 in Central and East Java, not including those lost in Surabaya (Nasution 1955:18; 1980:25-6). Reid (1974:53) sug-

³⁸ Donnison (1956:428) believes, differently from Nasution, that the Indonesians in Surabaya were well organized. However, as Reid (1974:34) puts it, the autonomy of local fighting groups gave little opportunity for military leadership above company level.

³⁹ Nishijima and Kishi Kōichi (1963:493) assert that, as a result of the dissolution of the PETA by the Japanese, the PETA leaders, who at first distanced themselves from the *pemuda*, did a complete turnabout. B.R.O'G: Anderson (1972:105-6) believes that the dissolution of the PETA and *heihō* was responsible for the disastrous fragmentation of Indonesia's fighting power. With due respect, I cannot help doubting if Sukarno and Hatta could have prevented the swift, drastic action of the Japanese in disarming the PETA and *heihō*, however. If Miyamoto's figures are reliable, the Japanese in Java only made 20,490 weapons available to around 33,000 PETA men, to be reduced by 6,500 towards the end of the war (Miyamoto 1973:18, 27, 1986:233). Hence the PETA was seriously under-equipped, and besides was only made up of a number of local units, rather than constituting an integrated army under a single central command (Nugroho Noto-susanto 1979:115-6; 148). The *heihō*, on the other hand, formed part of the Japanese army, so that the Japanese had full control over them. I therefore do not believe that a general uprising of the kind suggested by Nasution (1977a:286-94) would have had a chance against the Japanese army. Besides, it seems to me that the fragmentation of Indonesia's military force was due in the first place to the large numbers of arms falling into the hands of the many different Indonesian groups that had received military training from the Japanese. It was also beyond Sukarno and Hatta's power to prevent this.

gests, what is even worse, that a well-equipped army superior to anything the Dutch possessed could have been formed in the interior if the lost material had been tactically withdrawn from Surabaya and the other cities.⁴⁰

Does this scathing judgement of Nasution's imply that the *pemuda* had failed again? Some authors (like Squire, 1979:126, and J.J.P. de Jong, 1988:136) interpret Nasution's verdict as being indeed as negative as all that: Nasution hastens to say, however, that even though the Battle of Surabaya ended in a military defeat, it was of great psychological importance, inspiring fellow Indonesians and demonstrating the nation's determination to fight for independence to the whole world. Wehl (1948:67) points out as well that the battle considerably influenced subsequent British policy.

The far-reaching psychological and political effects of this battle on the Indians, the British, the Dutch, and the Indonesians and on the relations between them have been mentioned in greater or lesser detail in the historiography ever since. The *pemuda*'s stubborn resistance in Surabaya made the world aware of the Indonesian cause for the first time (Dahm 1971:121). As a result of their action Indonesia's struggle for independence became internationalized (Frederick 1989:279) and won international support, where Sukarno and Hatta's government hardly achieved anything by diplomacy (Cribb and Brown 1995:21). The Battle of Surabaya was a turning-point (Kahin 1952:144), and in this sense the *pemuda* achieved a remarkable result. History offers other examples of heroic stands having an enormous impact without being of any consequence militarily. For instance, though in 1942 the Philippines were of no great strategic significance, the fact that the United States army held out against the Japanese much longer there than the other Allies elsewhere to an Allied world plunged in gloom, defeatism and despair was a symbol of hope and a beacon of success for the future (Morton 1953:584).

The point is, however, that the Battle of Surabaya, which lasted from 10 to 28 November 1945, was in fact preceded by another fierce battle. This battle, I fully agree with Frederick (1989:279), differing from Nugroho Notosusanto (1995:V), was certainly no less important or intense. As Frederick (1989:259) points out, the most notable feature of this battle 'was the role taken by crowds of ordinary kampung residents, who far outstripped in determination and savagery, anything the organized groups seem to have counten-

⁴⁰ Since Nasution criticizes the policy adopted by the government on 19 August 1945 (see Yamin 1959:463), it seems to me that according to his way of reasoning it was no longer possible for a well-organized army to be set up after the Battle of Surabaya even if the arms had been withdrawn. The Indonesian military power by that time had already become completely fragmented (see also Sidik Kertapati 1964:144). Salim Said (1991:13), quoting Nasution, points out that with the total amount of arms it acquired, Indonesia could have been militarily much stronger than the Dutch, but I was not able to find any statement of Nasution's to this effect in the source Salim Said is referring to (Nasution 1955:18).

anced'. Up until 1970 it did not receive much publicity, according to Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1972:7), in spite of the fact that – differently from what most authors, like recently Giebels (1999:394), suggest – it was this battle, and not that in November, that shocked the world (Kadim Prawirodirdjo 1987:8). Roeslan Abdulgani (1975:55-6) also puts forward the view that it was the fighting that raged on 28-29 October which for several days received conspicuous attention in the world press. Especially the headlines about the killing of Brigadier Mallaby on 30 October⁴¹ aroused worldwide interest (see also Wehl 1948:62; Parrott 1975:87, 1977:69-70). In view of the emphasis placed by some historians on the Indonesian military effort during the second battle rather than this first one, Squire (1979:123-4) contends that the Supreme Commander for South East Asia, Mountbatten, submitted a request for three divisions – one more than the two⁴² already earmarked for Java – to his superiors on 5 November (Van der Wal 1971:527-30; Dennis 1987:129), that is, before the second battle. According to J.J.P. de Jong (1988:133), Mountbatten moreover requested the Dutch Prince Bernhard before 7 November to send his former aide-de-camp to him to be briefed about a possible pull-out of British Indian troops from Indonesia around March 1946. The fighting in Surabaya in October had not failed to influence public opinion in India negatively (see Mountbatten 1969:293). What is even more important, it effected a change of policy by the Dutch Lieutenant-Governor-General Van Mook himself. On 6 November – again before what is usually indicated as the start of the Battle of Surabaya – Van Mook sent a warning to his government in The Netherlands emphasizing, with specific reference to the fighting in Sura-

⁴¹ Some authors mention a different date, for instance, Abu Hanifah (1972:153) and Nasution (1977b:355-6) 31 October, probably because the British announced the news on that day (*Djawa Timur* 1953:917); Wolf (1948:22) and Poulgrain (1998a:36, differently from 1998b:322) 4 November; and recently Van Poelgeest (1999:36) 29 October. On 30 October Mallaby still attended a meeting between Sukarno and Major-General Hawthorn, commander of the 23rd Indian Division, however (Pugh 1948:339; Doulton 1951:260; Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:39). For an in-depth analysis see Parrott 1975, who concludes that Mallaby was killed by an Indonesian. According to Barlan Setiadijaya (1992:453-7) he was shot by the Indonesian Abdulazis (Doel Arnowo, although he was aware of this, tried to convince B.R.O.G. Anderson, 1972:162, that Mallaby was shot by his own men), although this author is still in doubt as to whether Abdulazis' shot or a British hand grenade was fatal to Mallaby. Wehl (1948:61) pointed out, however, that Mallaby's car bore no traces of an explosion. Recently Poulgrain (1998a:36, 1998b:322) has contended that Mallaby was deliberately assassinated by someone firing from his own headquarters. Mallaby was not killed in front of his headquarters (located in the centre of the town, near the Government buildings; see Pugh 1948:330), however, but near the Internatio building (see map in Doulton 1951:251). Presumably Poulgrain's source was still sticking to the outdated Indonesian view.

⁴² They were the 23rd and 5th Indian Divisions. Whereas J.J.P. de Jong (1988:105) assumes that the 23rd Division was the second division requested by Mountbatten on 11 October, in fact it was the first to be deployed in Java (Doulton 1951:230; Mountbatten 1969:291), Mountbatten having wanted to accelerate its arrival (Van der Wal 1971:337).

baya and Magelang (Van der Wal 1971:548), that the Indonesian forces were extremely strong, as were Indonesian nationalism and the Indonesian desire for independence. J.J.P. de Jong (1986:163, 182, 1988:134, 136) suggests that Van Mook realized already at that point that it was impossible to restore colonial rule in Indonesia and that a policy of decolonization through negotiation should be pursued instead. This change was made explicit shortly afterwards in a document drawn up by Idenburg, the chief of the Lieutenant-Governor-General's staff, pointing out among other things that the success of the Indonesian armed actions in Surabaya and other areas had had a great psychological impact (Van der Wal 1972:19). Since this document was dated 10 November, when the second Battle of Surabaya had just begun, Idenburg, like Van Mook in his cable of 6 November, cannot but have meant by 'Indonesian armed actions in Surabaya' the first battle in October.⁴³ Van Mook – who, as J.J.P. de Jong (1988:100, 173) indicates, personally was convinced already at that time of the necessity of having talks with Sukarno – had earlier ignored the strict instructions of the Netherlands government not to meet Sukarno (Van der Wal 1971:472) and had agreed, according to Yong Mun Cheong (1982:46), Squire (1979:120), and Dennis (1987:139) under pressure from the British with a view to defusing the critical situation in Surabaya, to a meeting being held on 31 October.⁴⁴ When reprimanded about this by his government in The Netherlands, he explained that he had not been able to refuse, as under the critical circumstances at the time this would have been utterly harmful militarily, and therefore unacceptable to the British, who had repeatedly sought Sukarno's support against the Indonesian militants (Van der Wal 1971:506-7).

The fact that the British needed Sukarno's help against the Indonesian insurgents is of course very striking. It indicates that in the first battle, differently from the second one, it was the Indonesians, not the Allies, who were on the winning side. Interestingly, the two historians writing about the 5th Indian Division (Brett-James, 1951:449) and The Netherlands in the Second

⁴³ Groen (1991:48) assumes, differently from J.J.P. de Jong, that Van Mook made the relevant switch-over later. In his cable of 6 November the latter took such a dim view of the situation, however, that he could not but already have come to the conclusion that, in view of the shortage of Dutch forces and their dependence on the British, restoration of colonial rule was impossible.

⁴⁴ *Soeara Rakjat* 1-25, 29, 31 October and 5 November 1945; Woodburn Kirby 1969:329; Subardjo 1978:392-3. Van Mook himself (1949:104) mentions a date of 23 October, though in view of his own reports (Van der Wal 1971:441, 489) this must be erroneous (see also J.J.P. de Jong 1988: 455). Smit (1952:66), referring to Van Mook, is well aware of this error, though not so a number of other authors, such as B.R.O.G. Anderson (1972:180), Penders (1974:105), Yong Mun Cheong (1982:44), Cribb (1984:83), Osman Raliby (1953:62, whereas in 1952:48 he speaks of 1 November), Hatta (1978:467), and Sidik Suraputra (1991:50), while Soebadio Sastrosatomo (1988: 114) believes that the meeting was held on 20 October. The meeting that took place on 23 October was between the British and the Indonesians (Oey Hong Lee 1981:38-9).

World War (L. de Jong, 1988:726) both omit to tell why Sukarno was asked for help. The historiographer of the British in the war against Japan (Woodburn Kirby, 1969:324, 336) likewise only reports that the British sent Sukarno to Surabaya to put a stop to the fighting that broke out at 4.30 p.m. on 29 October (this date is incorrect, as we will see later). Only three pages on he writes, without explicitly indicating what the situation was actually like, that Christison, the general in command of the Allied forces in the Netherlands Indies, stated when reporting to Mountbatten that the situation in Surabaya was very grave and that his troops were virtually beleaguered. In this author's view the situation in Ambarawa and Magelang gave more cause for anxiety than that in Surabaya! Mountbatten himself (1969:292) concedes in his official report that the situation was beginning to look dangerous. Neither specifies exactly how critical it had become, however. The historiographer of the 23rd Indian Division, to which the 49th Indian Brigade belonged, is quite specific and frank on this point, on the other hand. He reports that the heroic resistance of the 49th Brigade in Surabaya was bound to end in its extermination unless someone was able to quell the passions of the Indonesian mob; all hopes rested on Sukarno's influence (Doulton 1951:257).

This time it is not the heroic resistance of the Indonesians that is mentioned, but that of the Indian forces. Indeed, in the first battle it was the Indonesians who were in the offensive and, as they brought the 49th Brigade to the brink of extermination, were even about to score an overwhelming victory! British sources (Pugh 1948:333-8; Doulton 1951:253-8; Brett-James 1951:448-50) describe in detail how ferociously the Indonesians assaulted the British. Already at the striking of the first blow on 28 October, eleven officers and 44 Indian soldiers were shot. The Indian troops in their scattered positions all over town came under heavy firing, with their ammunition fast running out. Every post was surrounded by Indonesians. On the same day the notorious attack on a convoy of lorries carrying Dutch women and children from Gubeng to Darmo – which according to Frederick (1989:260) was carried out by urban mobs, the *arek Suroboyo* – took place. Only a few members of the Mahratta escort (whom Giebels, 1999:388, like so many other authors, designates as Gurkhas, though, as Parrött, 1975:110, points out, the 49th Brigade did not include any Gurkhas) survived, and many women and children were most brutally massacred, only a few escaping with their lives. Only three lorries escaped from this scene of carnage.⁴⁵ In Kajoon one Rajputana platoon was forced to withdraw, while near the bridge in Wono-

⁴⁵ The Indonesian literature in general (and interestingly also Van Delden, 1995:195, 290) omits to mention this terrible massacre of women and children. One exception is Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1987:31), who, assuming like Wehl (1948:57), Oey Hong Lee (1981:43), and Giebels (1999:388) that the convoy was coming from rather than going to Darmo, claims that it

kromo another one was obliterated. On 29 October three isolated platoons were left in the area near the waterworks, with nothing but their bayonets. The Embong Malang radio station was set on fire, but the Mahratta platoon defending it, though choked by smoke and with their clothes burning, repelled attack after attack until their ammunition was spent and only a handful remained alive. Some of the few surviving Mahratta were hacked to pieces in their desperate attempt to escape from the flames (Hatta, 1978:474-5, heard of *pemuda* from Aceh drinking their blood). The others were thrown in gaol, where several were killed. The Rajputana company, occupying another gaol – where they fought side by side with 300 hastily armed Japanese prisoners (*Soeara Rakjat* 1-25, 31 October 1945; Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:35; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:371-2) –, was attacked and all but eighteen of its men were killed, sixteen of whom were afterwards executed. The Brigade's headquarters, too, were overrun by the Indonesians. In the course of four days the 49th Brigade suffered heavy casualties: sixteen officers and two hundred and seventeen men from other ranks killed, and two attached officers and one hundred and fifty-seven men wounded or missing (Mountbatten 1969:292, compared with Pugh 1948:345). It was quite clear that the 49th Brigade had implicated the British Indian army in a humiliating defeat (Parrott 1977:99). Although this is not confirmed by other sources (except in connection with attempts to bring about a truce), one Indonesian participant described how the British hoisted white flags in several places, among others Brigadier Mallaby's headquarters (Kadim Prawirodirdjo 1972:62, 64, 1978:399, 1987:8)!

Although the British had made themselves extremely vulnerable by dispersing their troops in small units all over the town, without securing their ammunition supply, instead of concentrating them (Parrott 1977:52, 58-9, 73, 95), the Indonesians undeniably scored an impressive military victory. So the first battle was important not only because of the psychological effect of their actions, but also because they almost wiped out the British. Although admittedly, as Wehl (1948:55) and Frederick (1989:259) point out, others were also involved in the attacks, such as the uncontrollable urban mobs, it was in Surabaya that the *pemuda* experienced their finest hour. It is rather curious, therefore, that some studies from before the 1970s (like Kahin 1952, for instance) either do not mention this battle at all or (like Wehl, 1948:63) mean by the Battle of Surabaya the battle that started on 10 November.

In actual fact it was on 28 October⁴⁶, Hari Sumpah Pemuda, 1945 that the

was perpetrated in reaction to the Allied raid on Kalisosok gaol to free Captain Huyer and other Dutch prisoners. Another exception is Roeslan Abdulgani (1975:28), who expresses his regret at it. As far as I was able to find out, the convoys from Darmo to the port only started after an agreement was concluded between Sukarno and Hawthorn.

⁴⁶ See Pugh 1948:333; Douulton 1951:253; Brett-James 1951:448; Parrott 1975:93, 1977:60; Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:27; Parera 1982:68-9; Kadim Prawirodirdjo 1972:60, 1987:13, 33; Barlan Setia-

first Battle of Surabaya broke out. Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1972) therefore refers to it as 'Ledakan Sumpah Pemuda di Surabaya', or the Explosion of the Youth Oath in Surabaya. Moreover, this was exactly the seventeenth Hari Sumpah Pemuda (Barlan Setiadijaya 1990:7), which is particularly meaningful to most Indonesians, as the number seventeen (Adams 1965:209) is sacred to Moslems: the Koran descended on the 17th day and Moslems perform seventeen *raka'at* or prostrations a day. As a result, Barlan Setiadijaya quite understandably regrets the fact that the first Battle of Surabaya is not commemorated in Indonesian historiography. I personally assume that this is because to many Indonesians Sukarno and Hatta's intervention was highly controversial.

Sukarno and Hatta were rushed to Surabaya in a British military aircraft on 29 October.⁴⁷ They appeared on the battle scene amid a hail of bullets (*Merdeka* 1-28 of 31 October 1945; Frederick 1989:262), very impressively showing extraordinary courage and determination⁴⁸, as *Peranan TNI* (1965: 91) puts it – which I believe confirms that they were not lacking in courage when facing the *pemuda* earlier on 15 and 16 August, either. They complied with the British request to intervene in Surabaya for diplomatic reasons (*Dokumentasi Pemuda* 1948:60; Salim Said 1986:50, 1991:14), although this was hard for the Indonesian people to understand (Osman Raliby 1952:41). It was

dijaya 1992:569. The latter says on p. 367 and on p. 7 of his 1990 publication, however – like Osman Raliby (1953:65, although in 1952:37 he mentions 28 October), *Sam Karya Bhirawa Anoraga* (1968:21), Abu Hanifah (1972:153), Ginandjar Kartasasmita (1977:48), Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto (1984b:112), and Nugroho Notokusanto (1995:33) – that the fighting started on 27 October. A few Indonesian authors are of the opinion that the battle began in the morning rather than the afternoon. Woodburn Kirby (1969:324) mentions 29 October as date.

⁴⁷ Some sources, like Broeshart et al. (1997:51) and Boer (1997:220), say it was 30 October. Hatta (1978:471) mentions a date of 28 October. Osman Raliby (1952:41), Parera (1982:71), Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto (1984b:112), and Broeshart (1987:22) claim that Major-General Hawthorn, commanding officer of the 23rd Indian Division, went with Sukarno and Hatta on 29 October. In fact, Hawthorn joined them in Surabaya only the next day to discuss the revocation of his order to surrender all arms as formulated in the pamphlets dropped on 27 October (Pugh 1948:336; for the provisional agreement concluded by Sukarno and Mallaby on 29 October, see *Soeara Rakjat* 1-25, 31 October 1945, and Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:31).

⁴⁸ Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:30; Nasution 1977b:362; Kadim Prawirodirdjo 1978:401; Soejitno Hardjosoediro 1987:67. Squire (1979:118), leaning on Christison, concedes that they entered the field of battle at great personal risk. According to Christison's unpublished memoirs (p. 184), Sukarno was quite fearless. A British eyewitness, Groom, says, differently from these sources, that Sukarno waved a white flag rather than the red and white flag (Parrott 1977:61). Hatta (1978:472) does not say that Sukarno and he were under fire, however. Sidik Kertapati (1964:157), Penders (1974:104), and Giebels (1999:389) claim that it was the British aircraft bringing Sukarno and Hatta that the Indonesians were firing at. According to Giebels, referring to Hatta's *Memoir*, Sukarno had to be persuaded by the others after landing to get off the aircraft. I was not able to find anything to this effect in Hatta's *Memoir*, however. Is this perhaps another reflection of the Dutch negative attitude to Sukarno?

entirely consistent, however, with their stance on the proclamation of independence, as well as with the Independence Preparatory Committee's rejection of a policy of war on 19 August.⁴⁹ Accordingly they ordered the Indonesians in Surabaya to lend Mallaby's brigade their full cooperation and were indignant at the fact that fighting had broken out instead. When the leader of the Indonesian insurgents in Surabaya and acting Minister of Defence, Moestopo, came to pay his respects to Sukarno and Hatta after their arrival, Hatta greeted him with the words 'Here comes the rebel, the extremist', which is indicative of another confrontation between Sukarno and Hatta on the one hand and the militant groups on the other, as in August. A violent quarrel ensued, ending in Moestopo's dismissal (Gani 1984:76; *Sejarah Panglima* 1989:154; Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:62). Moestopo therefore was no longer a leader in the second battle (as Cribb, 1991:112, alleges).

Sukarno and Hatta's intervention resulted in an Indonesian-British agreement being reached on 29 and 30 October. This, in Sidik Suraputra's opinion (1991:43, 65), was the very first international agreement concluded between a foreign power and Indonesia. The agreement was of immense importance, as here for the first time the British formally recognized the Indonesian army (although according to Van Delden, 1995:194, they did so only later, when making arrangements for the evacuation of internees by the Indonesian army) and allowed it to keep its arms. They also explicitly revoked their demand for the surrender of all arms within forty-eight hours, as formulated in the pamphlets dropped on Surabaya on 27 October in violation of the agreement of the day before⁵⁰ – providing one motive for the enraged

⁴⁹ *Asia Raya* 4-200, 19 August 2605; Yamin 1959:463. Penders (1974:98) claims that the word 'Preparatory' was deleted from this committee's name on 19 August, although it was still called Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan in the sources referred to here. Of course the Committee actually was no longer preparing Indonesia's independence (Sidik Kertapati 1964:124). Van Poelgeest (1999:25) appears to believe, like B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:88), Cribb (1984:65-6, 1986:77), and L. de Jong (1985:1042), for example, that the Independence Preparatory Committee by that time had already transformed itself into Komite Nasional Indonesia. However, the Panitia decided only on 22 August to institute the Komite, together with a National Party and a People's Security Organization. (*Asia Raya* 4-204, 23 August 2605). Giebels (1999:371), like B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:103) and Cribb (see also 1991:59), claims that the decision regarding the People's Security Organization was taken on 20 August. L. de Jong (1985:1042) mentions the 21st, and Kahin (1952:140) the 29th. Hatta (1970:72), very curiously, appears to believe that the committee had only two meetings, namely on 18 and 19 August. The Komite was officially installed on 29 August 1945 (*Asia Raya* 4-210, 30 August 2605). Overdijkink (1946:48) says this was the 28th.

⁵⁰ Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:25; Pugh 1948:331; Brett-James 1951:448; Donnison 1956:428; Woodburn Kirby 1969:323; Dennis 1987:124. As Wehl (1948:55) euphemistically puts it, the conditions stipulated in the pamphlets were more stringent than had been agreed with the Indonesians. Doulton (1951:250), Rajendra Singh (1958:227), Mountbatten (1969:292), L. de Jong (1988:726), and recently Giebels (1999:388) make no mention of this agreement being violated by the pamphlets. Doulton therefore rejects the idea that the pamphlet-dropping – to which Giebels even refers as a well-meant support action from Jakarta, failing to recognize it for the blunder it

Indonesians to begin the first battle, another motive being the raid to liberate Dutch prisoners; among them the Dutch naval captain Huyer⁵¹, on 26 October. Moreover, it was agreed that all detainees on both sides would be released (*Dokumentasi Pemuda* 1948:60; Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:31-9; Nugroho Notokusanto 1995:39-40).

According to Nasution's assessment (1977b:401), however, the *bencana*, or disaster, suffered by the Indonesians in the battle following in November could have been avoided if only they had prosecuted their assault on the 49th Brigade in October. Then the Indonesians could have seized the whole city and the 5th Indian Division would have been forced to launch an attack from the sea. Other Indonesian authors more directly blame Sukarno for putting a stop to the annihilation of the 49th Brigade (*Peranan TNI* 1965:90) or for letting himself be misused by the British (Salim Said 1986:51). Kadim Prawirodirdjo (1987:4) describes the order to cease fighting as a great national blunder, the consequences of which became evident only nine days later. Wehl (1948:56, 63), moreover, judges it most unwise from the point of view of those clamouring for the destruction of the 49th Brigade that they should have agreed to a truce and assumes that the Indonesians, surprised at their own success, did not seem to know what to do with it.

Does this mean that, differently from in August and September, Sukarno and Hatta this time were wrong? If so, then it is understandable enough that the first battle was not commemorated in Indonesian historiography for a long time. I personally am inclined to answer the question in the negative. Critics of Sukarno's intervention, and contemporary historians in general, do

was! – was the prime cause of the battle. According to Indonesian sources, it was agreed on 26 October that the British would only disarm the Japanese (who in fact already were disarmed by then). Pugh (1948:327), however, claims that any Indonesians not belonging to the armed forces or the police were to be disarmed as well (see also Woodburn Kirby 1969:323; Broeshart 1987:19). Differently from most sources, which report that the pamphlets demanded the surrender of all arms, Oey Hong Lee (1981:43), Parera (1982:68), and Frederick (1989:259) claim that certain categories of arms, like those of the army or the regular police, were exempted, while Doulton (1951), Woodburn Kirby (1969), and Nasution (1977b:360) mention that only the surrender of unauthorized arms was required. For the text of the agreement, B.R.O'G. Anderson (1972:159) refers to *Dokumentasi Pemuda* (1948:56), but the text in this source is that of a preliminary agreement between Pugh and Moestopo, not of that concluded by Mallaby and Moestopo. Although for the revocation of the demand to surrender arms Hawthorn's arrival had to be awaited (see also footnote 47), Giebels (1999:390) claims, curiously enough, that it was passed over without comment during the conference.

⁵¹ J.J.P. de Jong (1988:456), assuming that Anderson is the only author to claim this, considers the claim exaggerated. See, however, Wehl 1948:52; Reid 1974:51; Parrott 1975:53-4; Yong Mun Cheong 1982:46; Frederick 1989:258; Osman Raliby 1952:33; Nasution 1977b:359; Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notokusanto 1984b:111; Heru Sukadri, Soewarno, and Umiati 1991:109; Kadim Prawirodirdjo 1987:31 (see footnote 45).

not give a moment's thought to the gravity of the consequences if the annihilation of the 49th Brigade had been pushed through. Had Sukarno not intervened, the entire 49th Indian Brigade would have been wiped out, along with thousands of Dutch civilians (Reid 1974:52; see also Wehl 1948:56; Parrott 1975:93). In view of the uncontrollable behaviour of the masses in the first battle, as during the bloody attack on the convoy of Dutch women and children, there was every reason to fear a recurrence of this. If this had in fact happened, I am sure that world opinion would in utter disgust have turned against the Indonesians. To me it seems, therefore, that although the Indonesian militants indeed won Indonesia international respect, sympathy and support by their impressive fighting, they did so only thanks to Sukarno, who put a timely stop to that fighting. The Indonesians applied a combination of diplomacy and military force (Kahin 1952:145; Cribb and Brown 1995:22), in the same way as the British had done towards them, ever afterwards.

Roeslan Abdulgani (1975:31) expresses the view that it was some time before the Indonesians observed the terms of the agreement because of poor discipline and bad communications, but to me it seems that this was rather because of the large-scale participation of unruly mobs and irregular combat groups in the assaults. In the subsequent joint efforts to implement the ceasefire, Brigadier Mallaby was shot (see footnote 41), whereupon Christison on 31 October issued a special proclamation insisting on the surrender of all who had broken the truce and those who had murdered Mallaby, threatening otherwise to bring the full weight of his army, navy and air force and all the equipment of modern warfare to bear against the Indonesians (Van der Wal 1971:488). Sukarno, too, gave orders for the fighting to cease, severely censuring the continued shootings in Surabaya as being harmful to the interests of the Republic and lowering its international prestige (which J.J.P. de Jong, 1988:121, describes as appeasing!). '*Sebutir kecil racun arsenicum sudah cukup merusak segala air*'. (One small grain of arsenic is enough to poison all the water), he pointed out (*Merdeka* 1-29 of 1 November 1945; Osman Raliby 1953:521-3). Although up until now this has gone unnoticed in the historiography, Sukarno elsewhere in the same issue of *Merdeka* warned the citizens of Java against all relations with the extremists and urged them to cooperate with his army. Where according to Wehl (1948:63) the Indonesians took more notice of Christison's warning than of Sukarno's order, this seems unlikely to me, as no one surrendered. On the contrary, ten days later the Indonesians defied Mansergh's ultimatum for the implementation of Christison's proclamation. As Parrott (1977:98) points out, their victory had made them overconfident and so contemptuous of Allied retaliation. In Nasution's view (1977b:364) it was Sukarno whom the Indonesian people obeyed, although they did not understand the government's policy. Legge (1972:216) also

asserts that it was Sukarno who was heeded. Frederick (1989:279) states that the second Battle of Surabaya was not marked by the same degree of participation of urban crowds as the first battle, but omits to disclose the reason for this. Had the masses joined the fighting, as in the first battle, the number of Indonesian casualties in the second battle would no doubt have been much higher than it actually was. I personally believe it is possible that, in view of Sukarno's strict order of 31 October against fighting the British, the *arek Suroboyo* saw no alternative but to leave the city when Mansergh announced its occupation by his forces. If this is so, then Sukarno's broadcast saved the Indonesians from an even greater *bencana* than they actually suffered in Surabaya in November 1945.

The Indonesian governor of East Java had already been in contact with the British, with a view to bringing the situation under control, before the radio broadcasts in the evening of 30 October (Pugh 1948:341), however, so that the latter had already started acting on the Sukarno-Hawthorn agreement (Woodburn Kirby 1969:328). J.J.P. de Jong (1988:456), who is not aware of this, considers it curious that neither Pugh nor Doulton or Brett-James mention the broadcasts. Parrott (1977:71) assumes that the Indonesian governor and other more moderate leaders were severely shaken by Mallaby's death. Possibly they were being careful not to damage the Indonesian image in the world press and turn international opinion against them (Pugh 1948:345). I wonder, however, whether perhaps the conduct of the Indonesians was due rather to the fact that they at first interpreted the truce forced on the British as the latter's surrender (Squire 1979:119; see also Pugh 1948:339-41, 343; Brett-James 1951:450; Woodburn Kirby 1969:327) and then were under the impression that the British were about to evacuate Surabaya.

The Indonesians released seven captured British officers and 92 men from other ranks (Woodburn Kirby 1969:333) and allowed the Indian troops to retreat to the port area in the north and to Darmo in the south, in accordance with the agreement. The retreating Indian troops were escorted by the Indonesian army (Pugh 1948:343-4). Parrott (1977:72) regards this as one of the most undignified retreats by a British force ever! The Brigade's tactical situation was now sound for the first time since it had landed (Pugh 1948:345; though Wehl, 1948:63, believes it would even then not have been able to repulse a mass attack). Subsequently over six thousand Dutch women and children were evacuated, also in pursuance of the agreement (Pugh 1948:346-7; Doulton 1951:264-5; Brett-James 1951:451, 453), most curiously under an Indonesian army rather than an Allied escort (Roeslan Abdulgani, 1975:59, graciously omits to mention this). To me the claim (as made by Giebels, 1999:387, for instance) that Sukarno's mission was a failure therefore seems ill-considered. The escorts provided for the convoys by the Indonesians constitute a much earlier example of order in the chaos than what is reported by

Van Delden (1995). When on 6 November the last internees⁵² who wished to leave had been brought to safety, it was possible for the Indian troops in Darmo to retreat to the port as well.

This brings us, then, to where Mansergh's offensive started (Dahm, 1971: 121, assumes that Mansergh's troops surrounded the city). Legge (1972:216) wonders why the British, with their immediate mission in Surabaya accomplished, decided to seize the city after all. In B.R.O'G. Anderson's (1972:164) view, they could not possibly claim humanitarian objectives for their assault, since the last internees in Surabaya had already been evacuated (but see footnote 52).

Barlan Setiadijaya (1992:464-5) describes the situation as follows. Besides feeling uncertain about Christison's threat – should it be taken seriously or was it mere bluff? – the Indonesians believed that the Allies were abiding by the agreement. After the departure of two generals (Mallaby and Moestopo), the situation seemed generally quiet and peaceful, without any incidents taking place between the Indonesians and the British. The urban population was no longer showing aggression towards the convoys taking the internees to the port, either, but was obeying the President's order (Osman Raliby 1952: 48). Many *pemuda* leaders consequently felt they could well afford to leave for Yogyakarta to attend the Youth Congress on 10 November. The arrival of Mansergh's 5th Indian Division in port did not go by unnoticed, but the reports of this were rejected as false because people, very naively, deemed it impossible that the British should send fresh troops to Surabaya without first notifying the central government in Jakarta (see also Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:59; Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:53). Apparently the Indonesians were under the impression that their side was observing the agreement and so were not conscious of any guilt. Indonesian authors (like Nasution 1977b:369; Nugroho Notosusanto 1995:47; Heru Sukadri; Soewarno, and Umiati 1991: 117; Barlan Setiadijaya 1992:570) often therefore interpret the action by the 5th Indian Division as an act of revenge for Mallaby's murder.

The Indonesians near the British positions of course remained on the alert, which the British took as provocation. In the latter's perception the situation

⁵² *Soeara Rakjat* 1-33, 9 November 1945; Pugh 1948:348; Doulton 1951:265. A large number of them stayed in the town, however. Judging from what Broeshart says (1987:31-2), they had probably left the camps. During the second battle a number of them were forced by the Indonesians to leave the city and put in internment camps. The Indian forces sent to release them missed them again and again, as they were marched inland each time the former approached (Brett-James 1951:459). It seems evident from this that the Indonesians intended to use them as hostages. Although Van Delden (1995:197) mentions the fact of their being moved inland, she does not recognize it as part of a plan to use them as hostages, due to her focusing on internment as a means of protecting internees against the mobs (Van Delden 1995:192-3). See also Frederick's comment (1997:51).

was deteriorating rapidly; (Pugh 1948:348). According to one source (Woodburn Kirby 1969:333) the Indonesian army, contrary to the reports of its escorting convoys carrying internees to the port, began obstructing the movement of these and raising barricades as a gesture of defiance at the arrival of British reinforcements. The British were right, however, in that the Indonesians were indeed defaulting on their obligation, as stipulated by the Sukarno-Hawthorn agreement (see above), to release the Dutch men they had put in prison with a view to preventing any attempt at restoration of colonial rule.⁵³ In order to liberate them, the British had no alternative but to enter the city (Pugh 1948:349; Brett-James 1951:454). Besides, there was still an indeterminate number of ex-internees (Wehl 1948:64; Woodburn Kirby 1969:331; Brett-James 1951:453). Lastly, the British still had to disarm the Japanese and repatriate them from Java, as agreed to by the Indonesians on 26 October (*Soeara Rakjat* 1-23, 26 October 1945; ARA AS 5205-33:43), though pointing out that they had already disarmed the Japanese and distributed their arms themselves (Pugh 1948:326).

As the British rightly stated in their reply to Hatta's protest in a letter of 9 November against Mansergh's ultimatum – besides reminding the Indonesians of the imprisoned internees in Surabaya and the internees still left in East Java – these were in point of fact the arms Mansergh had ordered the Indonesians to hand in (Van der Wal 1972:11-2). The *pemuda* in East Java had been the first to succeed in acquiring Japanese arms on a large scale, their example prompting *pemuda* in other places to try and do the same, though not always with the same results. The question why this was possible in East

⁵³ Roeslan Abdulgani 1975:24; Pugh 1948:330; Brett-James 1951:446; Parrott 1977:50. On the liberation of these on 10 November, see Broeshart 1987:28-30; Broeshart et al. 1997:53; and Boer 1997:226-9. The Indonesians had already sprinkled petrol over the prison to put it on fire in the event of an attempt at liberating the prisoners. It is clear that in this case they did not imprison the persons concerned for their own safety. Van Delden (1995:195), who sets out to demonstrate that the Indonesians were not as bad as the Dutch often make them out to be, curiously argues that even where the Indonesians imprisoned potential enemies for the sake of isolating them, this was in the first place for their own protection. She seems to be of the opinion that, if they had wanted to neutralize enemies, they might as well have left them free (thus cynically suggesting that the mobs would in that case have taken care of them), as though any measures against the Dutch would have been as radical as that at the outset. The petrol sprinkled over the Surabaya prison clearly indicates that, if necessary, the Indonesians were ready to go to extremes, however. The Dutch men imprisoned in Semarang were likewise in danger of being eliminated (De Rochemont as quoted by L. de Jong, 1988:743; Broeshart 1989:33). Van Delden's argument on p. 192 that the reason for internment Dutch citizens was to afford them protection since many ex-internees themselves admit with hindsight that it was better after all to have been interned is curious as well. It is in contradiction with her view (p. 206) that protective internment was just that, even though the persons concerned experienced it as deprivation of freedom or believed themselves to be hostages. If the opinion of those concerned is decisive, as Van Delden argues, then it should also be so in the latter case. In my view the Indonesians' purpose in incarcerating Dutch citizens is of crucial importance.

Java is a subject for separate analysis.

As Squire (1979:124) and Frederick (1989:264) point out, the allegation that Mansergh's action was intended as a counter-blow in revenge for Mallaby's assassination is therefore unfounded. To the British it was the discharge of their duty that was at issue. In this context it should be pointed out that the 5th Indian Division was ordered on 17 October, two weeks prior to Mallaby's death, to move to Surabaya from Singapore and Negri Sembilan (Woodburn Kirby 1969:322). Feelings of revenge may have played a part in the resoluteness and ruthlessness with which the operation was carried out, but were not the immediate motive behind it.

Many authors, like Roeslan Abdulgani (1975:74) and recently Giebels (1999:392), make it look as if neither Sukarno nor Hatta raised any objections to Mansergh's ultimatum. It therefore seems proper to mention Hatta's protest. Although the Indonesians were in default, Sukarno protested in a press interview (*Merdeka* 1-38, 12 November 1945; Osman Raliby 1953:89-90; Nasution 1977b:384-5) against the ruthless British shooting and bombing of helpless Surabaya citizens. He tried to draw the attention of the whole world to this large-scale carnage, expressing his doubts as to the British justification for this. Even if the world felt that the British had good reason for taking punitive measures, these were nevertheless out of all proportion, in his opinion. Most striking was his reiterated expression of his dislike for the extremists, who he said could only be put under control gradually after the Indonesian army had been built up. Sukarno's remarks drew sharp criticism from the editor of *Merdeka*, even though he had apparently been alluding this time to the irregular military bands, the tale of the deeds of many of which, as Abu Hanifah (1972:175) points out, constitutes a black page in the history of the *pemuda* revolution. As Salim Said (1997) has recently observed, these irregular soldiers continued for many years to pose a serious problem for Indonesia, as, for example, in the 17 October affair of 1952. Those who later came to form the core of Darul Islam (Van Dijk 1981:20, 71, 81) even held out until 1963.

Hence the dissolution of PETA and the *heihō* by the Japanese and the availability of large quantities of Japanese arms to numerous Indonesian groups (see footnote 39), although unintended, had far-reaching consequences. Irregulars, though of a different background, today are causing trouble again in Indonesia.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARA AS Algemeen Rijksarchief (The Hague), former Algemene Secretarie records.

KNIL	Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army).
NIOD	Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie.
PETA	Pembela Tanah Air (Indonesian Army for the Defence of the Fatherland, instituted by the Japanese Army in 1943).

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5204-13	E. Brunsveld van Hulsten, 'Rapport over de Japansche invloeden op de Merdeka Beweging en de gebeurtenissen in de Augustusdagen', 24 July 1946.
5204-15	Rear-Admiral Maeda Tadashi, interrogation on 16 April 1947.
5204-18	Nishijima Shigetada, statements of 10-13 March 1947, 'betreffende de Indonesische Onafhankelijkheidsbeweging en de bijeenkomsten ten huize van Maeda op 16/17 Augustus 1945'.
5205-23	Major-General Nishimura Ōtoshi, signed statement of 10 April 1947.
5205-24	Major-General Nishimura Ōtoshi, signed statement of 15 April 1947.
5205-25	Major-General Nishimura Ōtoshi, replies to questioning of 25 April 1947.
5205-32	Rear-Admiral Maeda Tadashi, report of 16 April 1947.
5205-33	'Independence Movement Immediately after the Cessation of Hostilities; Change in Trend of the Independence Movement', compiled by 16 Army HQ, 12 December 1945.
5205-36	'Beschouwingen over de Algemene en Financiële Voorbereiding van de Indonesische Onafhankelijkheidsbeweging door de Japanners', Netherlands Indies Forces Intelligence Service, 24 June 1947.
5205-37	Lieutenant-Colonel Nomura Tetsu, statement.
5205-39	Major-General Nishimura Ōtoshi, replies to questioning of 25 April 1947.
5207	Captain Nakamura Hiroshi, 'Points of Discussion, 16 August 1945, 12 o'Clock Night'.
5208(a)	Captain Nakamura Hiroshi, 'The Independence Movement Immediately after the Armistice and the Reorientation of the Independence Movement', statement of 15 April 1946.
5208(b)	Saito Shizuo, interrogation concerning the Independence Movement, 4 May 1946.
5208(c)	Major-General Nishimura Ōtoshi, interrogation on 31 May - 6 June 1946.

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NIOD	
005843-	Colonel Abdoel Kadir W[idjoatmodjo], memo entitled 'Comité

- 005847 voor het Onderzoek naar de Maatregelen ter Voorbereiding van de Onafhankelijkheid'.
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 006895- Rear-Admiral Maeda, interrogation 31 May - 14 June 1946.
 006902
 059326-II Nakatani Yoshio, 'An Outline of the Conversation between the Chief of General Affairs and Messrs. Soekarno and Hatta at the Residence of the Chief of General Affairs (Somubucho) around Midnight of the 16th of August 1945', 21 February 1946.

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